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Cortical processing and perceived timing
Derek H. Arnold* and Paul Wilcock
School of Psychology, The University of Queensland, St Lucia, Queensland 4072, Australia
As of yet, it is unclear how we determine relative perceived timing. One controversial suggestion is that
timing perception might be related to when analyses are completed in the cortex of the brain. An alternate
proposal suggests that perceived timing is instead related to the point in time at which cortical analyses
commence. Accordingly, timing illusions should not occur owing to cortical analyses, but they could occur if
there were differential delays between signals reaching cortex. Resolution of this controversy therefore
requires that the contributions of cortical processing be isolated from the inﬂuence of subcortical activity.
Here, we have done this by using binocular disparity changes, which are known to be detected via analyses
that originate in cortex. We ﬁnd that observers require longer stimulus exposures to detect small, relativeto
larger, disparity changes; observers are slower to react to smaller disparity changes and observers
misperceive smaller disparity changes as being perceptually delayed. Interestingly, disparity magnitude
inﬂuenced perceived timing more dramatically than it did stimulus change detection. Our data therefore
suggest that perceived timing is both inﬂuenced by cortical processing and is shaped by sensory analyses
subsequent to those that are minimally necessary for stimulus change perception.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A single physical event can induce activity that is widely
distributed both in time and across different, specialized,
sensory regions of cortex (Zeki 1978; Bullier 2001). The
temporal distribution of neural activity related to a
common physical event raises the possibility that we
might exist in patchwork perceptual moments pieced
together from different epochs at whatever rate the brain
cansustain(Moutoussis&Zeki1997;Bartels&Zeki1998;
Whitney & Murakami 1998; Arnold et al. 2001).
While it is generally accepted that timing illusions can
be instigated by differential delays between physical
exposure to a stimulus and the onset of activity in cortex
(Roufs 1963; Wilson & Anstis 1969), the possibility that
subsequent processing within cortex might also contribute
is more controversial (Dennet & Kinsbourne 1992;
Johnston & Nishida 2001; Nishida & Johnston 2002).
Many sensory judgements require that cortical activity be
ﬁrst integrated over time before a sensory threshold is
achieved (Bartels & Zeki 1998; Van de Grind 2002). This
necessity could inﬂuence timing judgments. However,
such a relationship between cortical processing and
perceived timing could cause unnecessary timing errors
(Dennet & Kinsbourne 1992; Johnston & Nishida 2001;
Nishida & Johnston 2002). Hypothetically, these errors
could be eliminated if perceived timing were related to
when cortical analyses commence rather to when they ﬁnish
(Libet et al. 1979; Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000; Rao et al.
2001; Moradi & Shimojo 2004; Amano et al. 2007).
Determining whether there is a relationship between
cortical processing and perceived timing can be proble-
matic as it can be difﬁcult to tease apart the contributions
of cortical activity from that which occurs in subcortical
structures. It is, however, possible to isolate the inﬂuence
of cortical processing by examining a stimulus change that
can only be detected via analyses that originate in cortex
and which is not confounded with other cues that are
detectable by subcortical mechanisms.
Analysesofseveralvisualattributesoriginateincortex—
orientation, spatial frequency and binocular disparity
provide a few examples (Hubel & Wiesel 1962, 1968;
Barlow et al. 1967; Poggio & Fischer 1977). However,
cortical mechanisms receive input via subcortical
structures where neurons can provide a transient response
to local changes in luminance and colour (Derrington &
Lennie 1984; Derrington et al. 1984; Lee et al. 1989;
Meriganetal.1991).Mostsimplevisualeventsarecoupled
with such changes so that the timing of these events could
be signalled by either cortical or subcortical mechanisms.
However, itispossible tobreakthis confound (andthereby
isolate any cortical contribution to timing perception) by
using a speciﬁc form of binocular disparity.
Binoculardisparityoccursbecauseoureyesareseparated
and receive slightly different retinal images. For most
observers, these differences provide cues concerning the
three-dimensional structure of the surrounding environ-
ment.Forinstance,uncrossedhorizontalbinoculardisparity
(which is used in the following experiments) can create an
impressionofaﬁeldofdotsﬂoatinginspacebehindthepoint
at which the observer is ﬁxated (Julesz 1971).
Binocular disparity can only be detected following the
temporal integration of disparity signals (Uttal et al. 1975;
Tyler1991)whichbecomeavailableonlyincortex(Barlow
et al. 1967; Poggio & Fischer 1977). By using a dynamic
binoculardisplay,itispossibletogenerateatimingcuethat
can only be detected via cortical analyses and which is not
confounded with monocular cues that can be encoded by
subcortical activity (Julesz 1971). Any inﬂuence of
disparity magnitude on timing judgements using this sort
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relationship between the temporal integration of cortical
activity and perceived timing.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) General methods
Four observers, two of whom were naive as to the purpose of
the study and the authors, participated in each experiment.
All observers had normal, or corrected to normal, visual
acuity, colour and stereo vision.
VisualstimuliweregeneratedusingMATLAB softwaretodrive
a ViSaGe stimulus generator (Cambridge Research Systems)
and were displayed on a gamma corrected 2100 Samsung
SyncMaster 1100pC monitor (1024!768 resolution; 120 Hz
refresh rate). All stimuli were viewed, from a distance of
approximately 78 cm, through an individually adjusted mirror
stereoscope.Thestimuliwerepresentedtoboththeleftandright
eyes and surrounded by pink (CIE 1931; XZ0.23, YZ0.10,
luminanceZ14.45) frames. Black central ﬁxation points and
crosses were presented to both the left and right eyes.
In this experiment, it is essential to use a stimulus wherein
the binocular change is not coupled with any monocular cues
so that we can be sure that we are manipulating a stimulus
change that is detected via a cortical analysis. For this reason,
we used a stimulus consisting of dynamic noise patterns
(3.58!3.58, element size 0.0358 square) updated at the
monitor refresh rate (120 Hz). Disparity changes in this type
of stimulus are not coupled with detectable monocular
changes (Julesz 1971). Uncrossed horizontal binocular
disparity (08–0.288) was generated by shifting the dynamic
elements in the left eye stimulus to the left relative to these in
the right eye stimulus. This generated uncrossed disparity
which, when perceived, made the ﬁeld of dynamic dots
appear to be positioned further away from the observer
relative to the central ﬁxation points and surrounding frames.
When there was no disparity signal, the ﬁeld of dynamic dots
appeared to be in the same depth plane as the ﬁxation point.
(b) Experiment 1
In experiment 1, a two-interval forced choice task was used to
determine temporal thresholds for detecting transient
disparity signals—an objective signal detection paradigm.
Each of the sequential intervals persisted for 1 s and were
separated by a 500 ms interstimulus interval (ISI). The test
stimulus consisted of a 1 s interval incorporating a period
(0–200 ms) during which one of four magnitudes of
uncrossed horizontal binocular disparity (0.078, 0.148, 0.218
and 0.288) was presented. Presentation of the disparity signal
was centred within the interval. The comparison stimulus
consisted of a 1 s interval during which dynamic random
noise was presented without a disparity signal. Interval order
presentation was randomized on a trial by trial basis. On each
trial, observers were required to indicate, by pressing one of
two response buttons, which of the two intervals contained
the test stimulus. Feedback was provided via high or low
tones to indicate response accuracy.
Data from each run of trials in experiment 1 provided
distributions of correct test stimulus interval detection as a
function of binocular disparity signal duration. Weibull
functions were ﬁtted to these distributions and the 75%
points taken as temporal threshold estimates for binocular
disparity detection. Temporal threshold differences (TTDs)
were calculated relative to the observers’ temporal threshold
estimate for the smallest disparity signal. Negative values
therefore indicate that disparity changes could be detected
following shorter stimulus presentations relative to 0.078
disparity changes.
(c) Experiment 2
In experiment 2, a simple reaction time (RT) task was used.
Each trial consisted of 1.8 s presentations of dynamic random
noise. On 80% of trials, binocular disparity signals of variable
magnitude (0.078, 0.148, 0.218 and 0.288) were introduced at
the halfway point of the stimulus presentation. On the
remaining 20% of trials, no disparity signal was presented.
Observers were required to press a response button, as
quickly as possible, if they detected a binocular disparity
signal. If no disparity was detected by the end of the stimulus
presentation, observers pressed a second response button.
A conservative response criterion was enforced by informing
observers that if they falsely reported disparity on more than
5% of the trials in which no disparity signal was presented,
their data would be rejected and the experiment repeated.
None of our observers exceeded this criterion.
Data from each run of 500 trials in experiment 2 provided
RT distributions for each of the four magnitudes of horizontal
disparity change (0.078,0 . 1 4 8,0 . 2 1 8 and 0.288). RT
differences were calculated relative to the observers’ RTs for
the smallest disparity signal. RT differences as a function of
disparity magnitude are shown in ﬁgure 1c,d.
(d) Experiment 3
In experiment 3, a forced choice temporal synchrony
judgement was used—a subjective measure of timing. At
the start of each trial, there was no disparity signal. During a
run of trials, the timing of binocular disparity onsets was
manipulated (G300 ms) relative to colour changes according
to the method of constant stimuli. Observers were required to
indicate, by pressing one of two response buttons, if the
disparity and colour changes appeared to be synchronous.
The colour changes, from red (CIE 1931; XZ0.63, YZ0.10,
luminanceZ14.45) to blue (CIE 1931; XZ0.15, YZ0.07,
luminanceZ14.45), occurred near the mid-point of each
1.8 s stimulus presentation. The precise timing of the colour
changeswas randomized (G0.25 s) to ensure that the task did
not become an interval bisection procedure. During each run
of 390 trials, only one magnitude of horizontal disparity was
sampled. The different trial runs were completed in a
pseudorandom order by each observer in order to avoid
practice effects.
Data for each observer provided distributions of perceived
synchrony between colour changes and disparity onsets.
Raised Gaussian functions were ﬁtted to the distributions
obtained for each observer for each of the four magnitudes of
binocular disparity sampled. The peaks of the ﬁtted functions
were taken as perceived synchrony (PS) estimates. Perceived
synchrony differences (PSDs) were calculated relative to the
observers’ PS estimate concerning the smallest disparity
signal. Negative values indicate that disparity changes seemed
to occur sooner relative to 0.078 disparity changes.
3. RESULTS
(a) Experiment 1: minimal exposures for signal
detection vary with disparity magnitude
The minimal stimulus exposure necessary to detect a
stimulus change is often related to signal strength.
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context, we ﬁrst determined minimal exposure durations
for detecting transient binocular disparity signals of
differing magnitude. As can be seen in ﬁgure 1b, although
there was some individual variation, the minimal exposure
timerequired foran observer to detecta transient disparity
signal was negatively related to disparity magnitude
(F3,12Z13.84, p!0.05)—a ﬁnding consistent with
previous research (Uttal et al. 1975; Tyler 1991).
(b) Experiment 2: rapid stimulus detections
prompt faster reaction times
Larger disparity signals can be detected following shorter
stimulus presentations than can smaller changes,
suggesting that the former might be perceived more
rapidly than the latter. We ﬁrst tested this possibility by
determining simple RTs for disparity changes of differing
magnitude. As can be seen in ﬁgure 1c,d, RTs following
the onset of a binocular disparity signal were negatively
related to disparity magnitude (F3,12Z3.97, p!0.05).
This is consistent with the premise that information
concerning large disparity changes becomes available for
motor planning more rapidly than does information
concerning smaller changes.
(c) Experiment 3: large disparity changes seem to
happen earlier than do smaller changes
Large disparity signals can be detected following shorter
stimulus presentations than can smaller changes.
They also prompt more rapid responses suggesting that
perceptual information concerning large disparity changes
is available more rapidly than that concerning smaller
changes. However, the mechanisms that determine
perceived timing might compensate for the variable
temporal dynamics of different cortical analyses (Libet
et al. 1979; Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000; Rao et al. 2001).
We therefore determined subjective timing estimates for
different magnitudes of disparity change. Disparity signal
onsetswere measured relative to colour changes. As can be
seen in ﬁgure 1e,f, we found that the onsets of large
horizontal disparity signals seemed to coincide with earlier
colour changes relative to smaller disparity onsets (F3,12Z
14.76, p!0.05). As binocular disparity analyses originate
in cortex (Barlow et al. 1967; Poggio & Fischer 1977),
these ﬁndings clearly show that cortical analyses can
inﬂuence perceived timing.
4. DISCUSSION
We have shown that large binocular disparity signals can
be detected more rapidly (experiment 1), be responded to
sooner (experiment 2) and can seem to occur at earlier
epochs (experiment 3) relative to smaller disparity signals.
As analyses of binocular disparity originate in cortex, our
ﬁndings clearly show that cortical processing can inﬂuence
perceived timing.
As we mentioned in §1, it is already generally accepted
that timing illusions can be instigated by differential delays
between the physical exposure to a stimulus and the onset
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Figure 1. Scatter plots (a,c,e) show data for four individual observers. Bar graphs (b,d,f ) show data averaged across these
observers. Error bars show G1 s.e. (a) Scatter plot showing temporal detection threshold differences (TT differences), relative
to temporal threshold estimates concerning disparity changes of 0.078, as a function of disparity change magnitude. (b) Average
TT differences. (c) Scatter plot showing RT differences, relative to RTs for disparity changes of 0.078, as a function of disparity
change magnitude. (d) Average RT differences. (e) Scatter plot showing perceived synchrony (PS) differences, relative to PS
estimates concerning disparity changes of 0.078, as a function of disparity change magnitude. ( f ) Average PS differences.
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However, the possibility that the variable dynamics of
cortical processing might further contribute to the
generation of timing illusions has remained a point of
contention(Libetetal.1979;Eagleman&Sejnowski2000;
Johnston & Nishida 2001; Rao et al. 2001; Nishida &
Johnston2002).Thesigniﬁcanceofourdataisthatwehave
usedastimulusattributethatcanonlybedetectedowingto
an analysis that originates in cortex. Therefore, there is no
ambiguity concerning whether or not our perceived timing
effectscanbeattributed totheinﬂuence ofcorticalactivity.
Thisisnottrueforotherapparenttimingillusions(Mackay
1958; Roufs 1963; Wilson & Anstis 1969; Moutoussis &
Zeki 1997) which involve stimulus characteristics pro-
cessed extensively in subcortical structures, such as
luminance, colour and motion.
In the interests of clarity, we will expand brieﬂy on this
last point. In primates, motion direction sensitivity is
dependent upon cortical analyses (Dubner & Zeki 1971;
Zeki 1974; Zeki et al. 1991). However, direction changes
within a persistently moving stimulus (or at the onset of
motion within a previously static surface) can induce
transientsignals in subcorticalneurons thatare sensitiveto
different rates of temporal modulation (Derrington &
Lennie 1984; Lee et al. 1989; Merigan et al. 1991). Thus,
it is conceivable that a timing illusion involving motion
might be driven, at least in part, by subcortical analyses
rather than cortical.
We place greatest emphasis on our direct measure of
perceivedtimings(experiment3)andonour measureofthe
minimal stimulus exposures necessary to detect transient
disparity changes (experiment 1). Both are marked by
qualitatively similar trends. Progressively shorter stimulus
exposures are required to detect larger transient disparity
changes (experiment 1). Similarly, larger disparity changes
seemtooccuratprogressivelyearlierepochs(experiment3).
There are, however, marked quantitative differences
between these two measures. Experiment 1 involved an
objectivemeasureofsensitivityandwasmarkedbyrelatively
small effect sizes (largest effect approx. 29G13 ms).
Experiment3usedasubjectivemeasureofperceivedtiming
and was marked by larger effects (largest of approx. 58G
17 ms). This difference is consistent with a very large
literature showing that, in general, the strength of a sensory
signal must exceed that of an objective threshold by some
margin before the observers feel conﬁdent that they have
detected that signal (Green & Swets 1966; Campion et al.
1983; Azzopardi & Cowey 1998). The difference between
our measures may therefore indicate that subjective timing
reﬂects the times at which observers become conﬁdent that
they have detected a stimulus change (also see Arnold &
Clifford 2002; Bedell et al. 2003; Ogmen et al.2 0 0 4 ).
Presumably, such conﬁdence arises following analyses
subsequent to those that are minimally necessary for
objective stimulus change detection.
We place less emphasis on our RT data (experiment 2).
RTs might resemble a simple measure of sensory
processing, but they are confounded with both the
preparation and execution of motor responses. It can
therefore be difﬁcult to attribute, with conﬁdence, RT
variance to sensory processing. A further complication is
posed by the characteristics of visual processing in the
human brain. Speciﬁcally, visual processing is multi-
faceted and distributed across many different brain
structures (Zeki 1978), so it is possible that a sensory
processing difference could inﬂuence manual RTs but
have no impact on perceived timing. However, our RT
measures (experiment 2) were qualitatively similar to our
direct measures of perceived timing (experiment 3) in that
both suggested that information concerning large disparity
changes becomes available at earlier epochs than that
concerning smaller changes.
The systematic variance in perceived timing as a
function of disparity change magnitude veriﬁes a tight
relationship between cortical processing and perceptual
timing. Such changes are known to be detected via the
temporal integration of cortical activity (Barlow et al.
1967; Uttal et al. 1975; Poggio & Fischer 1977; Tyler
1991). Far from compensating for this necessity, such that
the changes seem to occur at the instigation of the period
of integration (Libet et al. 1979; Eagleman & Sejnowski
2000; Rao et al. 2001; Moradi & Shimojo 2004; Amano
et al. 2007), it seems that observers perceive the timing of
such changes as having occurred at the point at which they
became conﬁdent of change detection. The inﬂuence of
the temporal integration of cortical activity is therefore
even greater in this context than might be expected on the
basis of objective sensory thresholds.
Cortical processing differences have previously been
cited as an explanation for a variety of timing illusions
(Moutoussis&Zeki1997;Bartels&Zeki1998;Whitney&
Murakami 1998; Arnold et al. 2001; Bedell et al. 2003;
Cliffordetal. 2004; Arnold2005).Theseproposalsremain
the focus of heated debate (Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000;
Nishida & Johnston 2002; Moradi & Shimojo 2004;
Amano et al. 2007). We will brieﬂy discuss how our data
relate to two of these persistent controversies.
When a ﬂash is presented in physical alignment with a
moving stimulus, the moving stimulus typically appears
to be spatially advanced relative to the position of the
ﬂash—the well-known ﬂash-lag illusion (Mackay 1958;
Mateeff & Hohnsbein 1988; Nijhawan 1994). It seems
that ﬂash-lag magnitude can be modulated by inducing
changes in neural processing speeds (Purushothaman
et al. 1998; Patel et al. 2000; Ogmen et al. 2004). However,
we believe that such differences usually play only a minor
role in the generation of this illusion (see Arnold et al.
2003). Further, we do not believe that the ﬂash lag
provides a precise tool for measuring perceived timing.
Flash-lag experiments usually derive a timing estimate
from the apparent spatial relationship between a moving
target and ﬂash. The assumption underlying such analyses
is that the illusion is driven primarily by a temporal offset
rather than by a spatial bias. This assumption may be
ﬂawed (Eagleman & Sejnowski 2002, 2007). Thus, even
when a ﬂash-lag measure involves binocular disparity
changes similar to those used here (Harris et al. 2006), we
could not tell if any similarities or differences between the
two datasets are necessarily systematic or coincidental.
Another debate surrounds the interpretation of a
timing illusion concerning changes in colour and direc-
tion—repetitive colour changes can seem to precede
physically synchronous direction changes (Moutoussis &
Zeki 1997). In a conceptually similar manipulation to that
used in experiment 3, it has been shown that the
magnitude of this illusion varies as a function of the
angular difference between the contrasted directions of
motion (Arnold & Clifford 2002; Bedell et al. 2003;
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as showing that the temporal integration, and therefore the
apparent timing, of direction changes are delayed in
proportion to the degree of inhibition between direction
selective V5 neurons (Arnold & Clifford 2002; Bedell et al.
2003). Readers should note that this interpretation
presumes a tight relationship between the temporal
integration of V5 cortical activity and the perceived timing
of direction changes.
A similar dataset has since been interpreted quite
differently (Amano et al. 2007). Speciﬁcally, it has been
suggested that while there might be some relationship
between the temporal integration of V5 activity and
perceived timing, any such relationship is minimized by
using the initial neural transient following a direction
change as a temporal marker for the determination of
perceived timing (Amano et al. 2007). This proposal is
similar to others in which perceived timing is supposed to
be more closely related to when cortical analyses
commence rather to when they ﬁnish (Libet et al. 1979;
Eagleman & Sejnowski 2000; Rao et al. 2001; Moradi &
Shimojo 2004; Amano et al. 2007). We believe that the
current data undermine such proposals.
Here, we have shown that the magnitude of a subjective
timing illusion can be greater than that one would predict
onthebasisoftheminimalexposurenecessaryforstimulus
change detection. As the changes in question can only be
detected via the temporal integration of cortical activity
(Barlow et al. 1967; Uttal et al. 1975; Poggio & Fischer
1977; Tyler 1991), our data clearly show that considerable
cortical processing can precede the neural event/s that
determine subjective timing. Our data are therefore
inconsistent with the notion that perceived timing is
referred back (Libet et al. 1979; Moradi & Shimojo 2004;
Amanoetal.2007)orispostdicted(Eagleman&Sejnowski
2000; Rao et al. 2001) to the time of the initial cortical
response following a stimulus change.
Our data are more consistent with an alternate
suggestion that perceived timing is a product of sensory
analyses subsequent to those that are minimally necessary
for sensory detection (Bartels & Zeki 1998; Zeki & Bartels
1998). The implication of this is that the determination of
subjective timing might involve a further analysis of
sensory events that have already begun to be perceived.
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